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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Obscenity
The Autumn 1964 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer contained a discussion, in the
Notes and Comments section, of the Jacobellis case decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States on June 22, 1964. In
this discussion the statement was made that
the holding resulted in a "national community standard" for the determination of
suppressible obscenity.
However, a different interpretation of
the Jacobellis case on this point has recently appeared in an article by the Honorable John F. Scileppi, Judge of the New
York State Court of Appeals, in the January 1965 issue of the New York Law
School Law Review. Judge Scileppi states:
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justices Brennan and
Goldberg argued that the standard must be
a national standard. It is to be noted, however, that this is not the opinion of the
court. The Chief Justice and Justice Clark
take issue on this point and maintain that
national standards do not control. This
part of the Roth test, therefore, has not
been finally settled by the highest court.
The Tropic of Cancer case, being an appeal from the Florida District Court of
Appeals, was decided on the same day and
on the reasoning of the Jacobellis case.
The Tropic decision has been widely accepted by lawyers and librarians as giving
a national clearance to the book. In view
of Judge Scileppi's analysis, it may well be
argued that this is entirely incorrect. If
the "community standards" rule has not
been changed, the Tropic case should only
be considered as binding in Florida. There-

fore, state and federal courts should continue to make their own findings as to community standards, and existing decisions
banning the Tropic of Cancer and other
obscene publications should be regarded as
valid and binding unless and until reversed
on appeal. It will be interesting to determine which position will ultimately prove
to be the correct one.
Part II of a two-part article on "Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom" was published in the Summer 1964 issue of the
St. Louis University Law Journal. Part I
was discussed in this section of the Summer
1964 issue of The Catholic Lawyer.
In the main portion of the concluding
Part II installment, authors M. C. Slough
and P. D. McAnany, S.J., take issue with
Mr. Justice Brennan's contention that hard
core pornography has no appeal for the
sexually mature or the ordinary adult. They
contend that even a high degree of offensiveness does not of itself eliminate the
factor of prurient interest appeal. Momentary subjective repulsion may stifle sexual
arousal in the sense that erotic stimulation
scarcely exists; yet, they are not prepared
to rule out the effects of morbid suggestion
upon the psyche of ordinary men. Nor are
they prepared to assert that erotic satisfaction is at a minimum in all pornographic
objects. In fact, they have noted that blue
movies, sex-tease photographs, and sundry
pornographic items can prove appealing to
the average adult despite the fact that one's
saner self considers such to be a violation
of a publicly held social norm or religiously
held sexual ethic. To hold that the sexually
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mature person is not attracted to the hard
core object is tantamount to asserting that
the emotional structure of man is a constant, unchanging thing, and they doubt
that prurient appeal can be measured in
terms of the absolute.
They concur with Chief Justice Warren's
observations to the effect that materials
should not be judged out of context, divorced from the color and character of
actual setting. Therefore, they freely admit
that they cannot press for the acceptance
of a constant, unbending standard that will
apply in equal measure to all persons under all circumstances. On the other hand,
they submit that appeal to pruriency
should, as a rule, be judged with reference
to the average adult, because implicit in
their concept of obscenity control is the
idea that the average adult is subject to the
lure of pruriency. In the interest of achieving simplicity, the two authors prefer to
think of patent offensiveness as a -cessary
concomitant of prurient interest appeal;
however, they recognize the fact that the
element of offensiveness may be considered
an integral part of appeal to pruriency or
stated as a requirement in the conjunctive.
When it appears that the object has been
designed and disseminated for a special
audience, notably the physically, mentally
and emotionally immature, they do not
question the wisdom of abdicating a constant standard which treats of appeal with
reference to the average adult. Adoption
of a variable obscenity standard becomes
a matter of necessity in these instances.
Employment of a variable standard
makes it possible to reach the panderer who
advertises and pushes the non-obscene object as obscene. Nevertheless, Slough and
McAnany would prefer to rely upon legislation which explicitly outlaws advertising
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appeals of this nature. Positive legislation,
evidencing the philosophy that any dishonest or fraudulent advertising effort shall
be prohibited, would reach the panderer
who exploits a public weakness by offering
the non-obscene as though it were packed
with prurient appeal. They have seen
that a concept of variable obscenity also
reaches the problem of the scientist whose
interest in pruriency is wedded to a valid
research effort, but they suggest that specific legislation could well be designed to
protect such interests. Basic in their approach to obscenity control is the idea that
no law, however precise, will achieve a
legitimate purpose unless it is administered
in such manner as to assess public attitudes in terms of time and place. This is
particularly true in regard to obscenity
laws, the unique contribution of which is
so dependent upon a proper evaluation of
sexual morals as mirrored by the contemporary community conscience.
Psychiatry and Law
"Psychiatry Pleads Guilty" is the title
of a most refreshing short article in the
current American Bar Association Journal.
In it the author, psychiatrist Robert Sadoff,
makes the startling admission that psychiatrists are guilty of extending the realm of
their expertise beyond its medical borders.
But this has happened, he continues, because courts and lawyers, searching for
assistance in determining the complex issue
of criminal responsibility, have insisted on
asking psychiatrists questions not specifically related to medical psychiatric
problems. The time has come, he concludes, for the law to decide the moral and
legal issues, and for the psychiatrist to remain a medical expert.
According to Dr. Sadoff:
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The psychiatric battle of the experts over
legal-moral issues is indeed a tragic one,
for it destroys not only the image of psychiatry to the public but also annoys the
legal professional, who feels intruded upon
and whose authority is usurped by the unwitting psychiatrist. As long as the psychiatrist is asked to consider the moral
questions involved and his opinion of responsibility is demanded in court, this
ignoble condition of forensic psychiatry
will prevail.
Yet, psychiatrists and lawyers continue to
debate the virtues and vices of the
M'Naghten test of criminal responsibility.
This is not the basic issue, but rather the
symptom of underlying anxiety on the part
of both lawyers and psychiatrists in regard
to man's inherent ignorance to settle the
age-old issue of responsibility. When is a
man responsible for his acts? When are his
acts predetermined? When "a product" of
mental illness? A passage in Ethics of the
Fathers reads: "Everything is foreseen and
yet the freedom of choice is given." The
ambivalent resolution of the deterministfree will conundrum is obvious even in the
wisdom of the sages.
Today we, too, are on the horns of this
dilemma, but we approach it indirectly by
asking: "Whose responsibility is it to determine when a man is responsible for his
behavior?" It is the responsibility of the law
to make this awesome determination and
it is the responsibility, nay, the duty of the
psychiatrist, to help the law by sharing unashamedly his knowledge of mental illness
and its relation to behavior.
It behooves the lawyer not to consider his
psychiatric servant an expert in anything
but psychiatry and it is incumbent upon
the "expert" not to testify to anything that
is not within the realm of his expertise.
Once these limits are set, we can stop using
M'Naghten and Durham as pawns in our
game of legal and psychiatric polemics and
begin to share the mutual responsibilities
of our roles in society in the determination
of criminal guilt or insanity.

Child Custody Laws
Criticism of custody procedures has increased sharply in recent months as legal
scholars have argued that court battles
often lose sight of the goal of the law, viz.,
to satisfy the best interests of the child.
Experts in law and psychiatry have contended that children frequently become
"pawns" in such proceedings, since everything is done in a context of conflict which
sharpens rather than eases parental ill-will,
and that the courts are thus cut off from
obtaining pertinent information from specialists in child welfare and behavioral
sciences.
A dissatisfaction with some, or most,
aspects of custody procedures has been expressed in recent issues of the Yale Law
Journal, the New York University Law
Review and the Michigan Law Review.
Much of the criticism centers on the traditional form of "adversary proceedings"
followed by courts, a form that accepts
the principle that justice emerges from the
battle of the skillful charge and the skillful
countercharge. But the critics insist that
the child's interests, which are supposed
to be supreme, are hardly spoken for in
this exchange, and that the present method
is ill-suited for determining these interests.
A survey of expert opinion in several
fields suggests that parents often seek custody of children not for love but for
money, and not to help the children but
to hurt the former husband or wife. It suggests, also, that rigid court rules often
prevent judges from getting the best medical and psychological information and encourage abduction of children from one
state to another in order to take advantage
of differing rule-of-thumb regulations in
various states.
These are the more searching and out-
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spoken judgments. Experts are not uniformly agreed, and by no means are they
convinced that the system should be extensively altered. But no individual interviewed failed to have some point of sharp
criticism. There was one remarkable point
of agreement: with one exception, every
individual interviewed spontaneously characterized the role of the child in custody
cases as that of a "pawn."
One child psychiatrist put it this way:
Because the unconscious and overt hostility of the parents makes them blind to the
emotional needs of the child, he is really a
pawn on the battlefield.

a superficial rather than a substantial
change of circumstances as sufficient for
a new custody award. "Trial courts can
almost always find changed circumstances
-the
age of the child, for example, if
nothing else," the Yale Law Journal
pointed out.
The "adversary proceedings" often affect the psychiatric and psychological testimony necessary to make a proper judgment on which parent shall gain custody.
Dr. J. Louise Despert, former professor of
psychiatry at Cornell University Medical
College and author of Children of Divorce,
said:

How little the needs of the individual
child have been weighed in court cases can
be seen in the changed rule of thumb often
followed by courts in regard to granting
custody to either a father or mother. The
patriarchal view that gave fathers almost
absolute rights to custody of their children
prevailed for centuries until 1939 when a
British court recognized that the mother
might have legal rights. United States
courts have moved more and more toward
a matriarchal position. The rule of thumb
in many courts is that a child up to five
years of age goes with the mother unless
she is manifestly totally unfit. New York
courts, for example, have refused to consider an adulterous mother unfit when she
had only one paramour. Alcoholic mothers
whose attributes were otherwise acceptable
have also won custody of children over
non-alcoholic fathers of good character.
Rules regarding modification of custody
awards provide that there must be a clear
showing of a substantial change of circumstances since the time of the original award
and that those circumstances require a
change of custody for the child's sake.
But some critics say that courts accept

The great deficiency in our system now is
that in these battles one psychiatrist is appointed by the father and another by the
mother, and they are drawn into the battle.
I have yet to see a case in which the two
psychiatrists are of one opinion.
Each psychiatrist gets all his details from
his side and never has a chance to consult with the other side-it is strictly forbidden by usage.
Since you do not ever get to know the people on the other side, you are necessarily
biased by the plethora of details which are
presented to you and it builds a picture
for you, which isn't necessarily the picture
that is true.
Once, when Dr. Despert was asked to
appear in court to give expert testimony,
she examined the child and found that she
must render her opinion not for the parent
who consulted her, but for the other side.
She disqualified herself:
If I had been appointed by the court, instead of by a side, I would have presented
my opinion. If an impartial psychiatrist
could see both parents and examine both
sides, then the testimony would be a lot
closer to the point.
To back up the contention that some
parents seek custody of children only to
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strike back at their former husbands or
wives, critics of the present system point to
cases in which parents who have gained
custody at great expense have abandoned
their right to custody after a brief period.
They also point to the fact that maintenance awards and other benefits granted
with custody of children are often valuable
and bring into the cases monetary rather
than loving considerations.
Among those seeking a better method of
deciding custody cases is Professor Henry
H. Foster, Jr. of the New York University
School of Law, chairman of the research
committee of the Family Law Section of
the American Bar Association. Professor
Foster upholds the adversary proceeding
as an appropriate method provided that
more appropriate social and psychological
facts can be brought to bear on judicial
decisions. He finds present custody cases
marked as a group by "question begging,
rigid rules and platitudes." His law research committee has drafted a statute that
the committee believes would improve the
situation. The statute sent to the Commissioners on Uniform State Law as a point
of departure for a model law would allow
a court to hear on its own motion any
person or expert whose skill or experience
would aid a court in arriving at a just
decision.
Another solution was advanced in the
June 1964 issue of the Yale Law Journal
by Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie, a psychiatrist
and neurologist. Because it is "always disturbing to children to be substantially removed from contact with either parent,"
he proposed that parents agree "that
neither of them shall have an exclusive
right to custody." They would try to agree
on where the child would live and for how
long, where he should go to school, etc.

If they could not agree the matter would
go to a mutually selected committee of
experts-a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, an
educator and a lawyer or clergyman.
Further, the children in the case would
be assigned a confidential trusted "adult
ally" from outside the family circle so that
they could express their ideas freely and
in confidence. He wrote:
It is rarely easy for a child to talk to adults,
and least of all to his own warring parents.
The adult ally would be picked from a list
of psychologists or psychiatrists.
I have seen extreme cases of parental hostility and it is heart-rending to observe the
child's position. Young children beg their
parents to live together again, even after
both are remarried. If you explain to them
that this is not possible they say, "Well,
they could do it somehow."
The committee's proceedings would be
confidential and aimed at resolving disputes, rather than exacerbating them by
causing courtroom battles.
Canons of Legal Ethics
According to the September 1964 News
Bulletin of the American Bar Association,
the organization is undertaking a broad reevaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the Canons of Professional Ethics
through a special committee on evaluation
of ethical standards. The committee has
been authorized to recommend changes,
and the study will require a year or more.
The review initially will embrace only the
forty-seven ethics canons applicable to
lawyers, and not the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which apply to judges.
President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. said the
project will be one of three receiving major
emphasis under his administration. He
named Edward L. Wright of Little Rock,
Arkansas, immediate past chairman of the
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House of Delegates, as chairman of the
new committee. Mr. Powell announced
that "many aspects of the practice of law
have changed drastically" since the canons
originally were adopted in 1908. An
American Bar Foundation study committee has noted, Powell said, that these
changes "make unreliable many of the
assumptions upon which the canons originally were based. As remarkably flexible
and useful as the canons have proved to
be," he said, "they need to be re-examined
as guidelines for the practicing lawyer.
They also should be re-examined particularly in view of the increased recognition of the public responsibility of our profession."
"It is not suggested that all-or even a
substantial number-of the canons are
obsolete." Mr. Powell further stated that
"there is certainly no thought of starting
out to rewrite de novo the ethical standards
of the legal profession."
The broad principles, as reflected eloquently in the Canons, are immutable. No
doubt, most of the present canons will be
found to be adequate; but in view of the
changed conditions since 1908 and the experience of the past half century, the time
has surely come for the American Bar
Association to take a careful look at this
critical area of our responsibility.
Mr. Powell said the committee will be concerned with the enforcement of the canons
as well as with their content. He said that
"there is a growing dissatisfaction among
lawyers, with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession." The
Missouri Bar Prentice-Hall survey showed
that "27 per cent of Missouri lawyers think
that perhaps as many as half of their fellow
lawyers do not comply with the professional canons." The ABA study committee
will "not deal directly with disciplinary
procedure and action," but will "carefully
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evaluate the extent to which departures
from high ethical standards and lapses in
strict enforcement are related to the content of the canons." "Appropriate revisions or additions," he said, "could contribute significantly to more effective grievance procedure, as well as to increasing
the level of voluntary compliance."
Church-State
An excellent survey note has appeared
in the June 1964 Notre Dame Lawyer
analyzing the problems which have arisen
in the past several years in the church-state
relations in America. With respect to the
doctrine of charitable immunity, the survey
reports that a majority of the fifty-one
jurisdictions have abolished the doctrine.
The trend of the law has been toward its
rejection. Even in states that maintain immunity for these institutions, exceptions
have been introduced. In cases that have
reaffirmed the doctrine, the commonly employed rationales for its continued existence are strikingly absent. The foundation for reaffirmation appears to be stare
decisis or, as in Indiana, the belief that
this is a matter for legislative determination.
Religious institutions have a vested interest
in the survival of the doctrine and as such
might be expected to be among its leading
proponents. But among these groups there
is a division of opinion, based upon moral
considerations, as to the desirability of
continuance. Various religious institutions
have recognized moral responsibility to
compensate injured parties by waiving their
right of immunity through the purchase of
liability insurance. Thus, it can be seen
that the charitable immunity doctrine is
not dead and that there is a diversity of approach and application among the states
that adhere to the doctrine, but the move-
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ment toward uniformity through abrogation continues apace.
With respect to taxation, the survey
states that although the decisions are often
explainable in light of the applicable state
statutes, the reasoning utilized expresses a
growing criticism of churches which claim
tax exemptions while engaging in entrepreneurial ventures. If the criticism continues it could affect settled doctrines of
religious exemption in the future. As for
the federal constitutional question, the Supreme Court may well avoid any decision
on the matter, at least until the clamor
abates from the recent School Prayer
Cases, and perhaps permanently. The
Court could utilize the lack of a "justiciable
issue" to avoid a decision on the merits.
Any changes relating to federal tax exemption will likely result from a congressional policy determination because of this
"standing" problem. If such changes were
to be made, Congress would probably
strive to eliminate the competitive advantages of the religious institutions engaged
in private businesses. An extensive alteration of our religious tax-exemption practices does not seem imminent or desirable
at the present time. As long as we believe
that our nation will be improved through
the enhancing of morality in our people,
then we ought to facilitate our churches'
attempts to accomplish this by rendering to
them at least indirect assistance through
tax exemption, especially where they are
not competing with private business.
On the matter of zoning, the survey observes that there have been no major
changes in the area with reference to
churches and parochial schools. How long
such a period of inactivity, and with it a
preservation of the status quo, is to continue is open to speculation. There are un-

solved problems, especially the constitutional problem of possible interference with
the exercise of religion if a church is excluded from a particular district. The
diversity of approach among the states remains, with some prohibiting the exclusion
of churches and others allowing it. As long
as the public is satisfied with the particular
approach that its state has adopted, or at
least remains apathetic, there is not apt to
be a major development in this area. If,
however, there is a demonstration of public
interest, for example, by instituting lawsuits, the state legislatures may be forced
to review their enabling acts and the courts
their decisions. Until such a manifestation
of concern, it would appear that the hiatus
will continue.
Right of Ownership
In April 1963, an English law periodical
entitled The Solicitor Quarterly published
an article by Richard Harding which
critically evaluated the Catholic position
on private property. The article started
from the untraditional proposition that for
Aquinas common ownership, and not private property, was a natural right. The
author concluded that there have been
"various changes in Catholic doctrine,
which together make up a fundamental
evolution from the time of Aquinas." In
short, in the critic's view, the "doctrine"
on the nature of rights of property has
changed. With respect to the jurisprudential
value of natural rights, he simply called
upon the familiar "doctrine" of Professor
Friedmann: one's attitude to "natural law
matters is a matter of personal predilection
which cannot be shown to be right or
wrong." But, he concluded somewhat
puzzlingly, "it can be shown to be good
or bad, based upon weak or strong evi-
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dence."
According to the excellent reply by
Albert Broderick, O.P., which appeared in
the April 1964 issue of The Solicitor
Quarterly, Harding's account is both misleading and erroneous. Since the inconsistency alleged by Harding in Catholic
property doctrine stems from the assertion
that Aquinas espoused rights to common
property, rejecting private as a natural
right, Father Broderick examines the analysis of St. Thomas on this point.
This examination results in a determination that at primary (prerational, irreversible) natural law there is nothing but the
generic right, common to all and absolutely primary, to share in the goods of
the earth. There is at this stage nothing
at all by way of choice or preference of a
particular, specific regime of property for
achieving this end. This choice of regime
of property is made by human reason, and
ordinarily incorporated in human positive
law. But this is no arbitrary choice by
reason-the evident circumstances and
consequences upon which reason reflects
requires choice by positive law of a regime of ownership that is in some sense
private. This is, as St. Thomas says, a typical secondary natural law or jus gentium
situation.
Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds
of natural law rights, or natural law. There
is the "natural right" that comes about
"without deliberate adjustment"; we have
seen the example of the natural adaptation
of the male to the female for generation.
In this sense private property is not a
"natural right." Historically, community of
goods may have come first. There is no
doubt that the role of property is "to benefit the species." But human reason reflecting upon human experience sees that this
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general benefit would not be best achieved
by a regime of common property to the
exclusion of private administration. And
when there is an evident reasonableness, as
in this case of private property, even when
enactment occurs the evident natural justice (of private regime of property) antecedes the positive legal enactment. In this
sense, private ownership is thus a "natural
right."
It has always been a puzzle and a
curiosity that Ulpian, one of the most
cited among Roman jurists in the Digest of
Justinian, had defined jus naturale as what
"nature taught all animals." And yet, while
recognizing that human living required that
man's inclinations be subjected to reason,
i.e., man's special inclination to "the human good," Aquinas adopted Ulpian's
words as phrasing primary natural law.
These primary propositions alone (plus
those they entail) are universal. The other
actions that man's experience and practical
reason tell him are for the most part necessary to achieve his basic objectives are
also called "natural law" precepts by St.
Thomas. Reason tells man they are evidently, though not absolutely, necessary
for success here; they are not mere
arbitrary choices, rather they are well
tested, general in scope and for the most
part accurate guides to conduct, "oughts"
widely recognized. Sometimes Aquinas
calls these secondary precepts, or proper
conclusions, of natural law; sometimes he
refers to them, in a special use of the
Roman term that became common in later
scholastic use, the jus gentium. A favorite
example of Aquinas of this second grade
"natural law" is private ownership of property. The right to use of goods, absolutely
necessary for men to live, is in general a
common primary natural right of all the
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race in general-and in the concrete for
any man in immediate dire need.
Father Broderick concludes that in a
philosophical dimension, St. Thomas, like
Aristotle, assumes a purposeful, basically
fixed nature in man. Only on this assumption can objective moral laws be explained
philosophically. In fact, Aquinas a priori
predicates certain basic prerational inclinations (later verified to some extent from
their effects by our observation) as the
guides to the basic precepts of natural law.
So long as man needs to eat to survive,
there is this irrevocable natural law regarding some form of property. But if a new
type of human animality developed that
made food unnecessary, the perspective of
food-property as a necessity would obviously disappear.
On the other hand, there are rules and
rights of natural law that Aquinas puts in
a separate and secondary category. They
reflect such observations about man as are
not universally verified, but true for the
most part. General change in them is perhaps unlikely, but not impossible to conceive. And in this category fits private
ownership of property. If the practical
premises upon which this doctrine is based
utterly collapse, a development that is obviously not anticipated by either Aquinas
or the papal doctrine, it would have to be
acknowledged that private property would
no longer qualify as a "natural right."
Meanwhile, as a general concept it is firm,
as to content it is fluid.
Becker Amendment
The Fall 1964 issue of The Georgetown
Law Journal contains a note which should
prove extremely interesting to The Catholic Lawyer readers in view of their large
mail response to our recent articles on the
Engel v. Vitale case.

In discussing the various constitutional
amendments which have been proposed
since the controversial School Prayer
Cases, the note comments that the problems
raised by the wording of all the proposed
amendments are myriad. Some have specified that recitation and reading of nondenominational prayers be allowed; others
have referred to the Holy Scriptures or to
the Holy Bible; still others have specified
religious worship, prayerful meditation, or
any prayer or other recognition of God.
Some of the proposals have used positive
language, asserting that prayer or worship
shall be allowed; others have taken the
negative form, stating that they shall not
be prohibited. Some have included the requirement that participation be voluntary;
others have stated that it must not be compulsory; and still others have provided that
those present must be given the opportunity to request to be excused. It is impossible to consider in detail the multitudinous problems of legal interpretation
posed by such langauge.
The note, therefore, singles out the most
famous proposal, the Becker Amendment,
and gives it a detailed analysis. According
to the note, the Becker proposal strikes at
only a part of the problem. It attempts to
reverse two specific Supreme Court decisions and to fight off the ghosts of future
decisions. Yet, its actual coverage is quite
narrow. Even if the Becker Amendment
became part of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, by adopting the Douglas
view, could hold such practices as the authorization of military chaplains and religious tax exemptions unconstitutional as
government "aids" to religion. It could be
expected that upon such a holding another
amendment would be proposed to "return
the situation to status quo." This is not

11
the proper function of a constitutional
amendment. It should not be called into
play every time the status quo is disturbed.
Rather, Congress should give consideration to the words of the first amendment,
viz., that it "shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ..

Natural Law
In 1954 Professor A. P. d'Entr~ves delivered a series of lectures at the Notre
Dame Law School which were later published under the title The Case for Natural
Law Re-Examined. In these lectures, as
their title indicates, the arguments favoring
use of the natural law concept in discussing
and solving problems of legal philosophy
were developed affirmatively, though at
times the author resorted to the negative
method of refuting theories opposed to his
basic beliefs.
A recent article in the November 1964
issue of the Stanford Law Review by Professor Edgar Bodenheimer uses a different
approach. Entitled "The Case Against
Natural Law Reassessed," the article examines some influential theories which
have been advanced to disprove the validity
of the natural law doctrine and then offers
refutation. A chief criticism discussed is
that the theory of natural law, in its historically most influential manifestations,
rested on the presupposition of permanent,
fixed, more or less universal precepts that
could claim validity for all ethical systems
and legal orders. The critics asserted that
such universal precepts did not exist, that
they were a figment of imagination. In support of this argument they pointed to the
diversity and heterogeneity of normative
regulation in the various countries of the
world. What is considered a crime in State
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A is regarded as perfectly permissible in
State B. What is deemed to be a perfectly
valid and enforceable contract in one country is proscribed as contrary to public
policy or bonos mores in another. A business practice outlawed as reprehensible in
some communities is accepted as unobjectionable elsewhere. A form of defamation
actionable in some legal orders may be
privileged in others. This was the main
thrust of the argument.
Professor Bodenheimer suggests that reliance on the empirical evidence of cultural
and legal diversity does not, per se and
without further argument, destroy the
foundations of a natural law approach. He
therefore suggests that the reply of the
natural law jurist in rebuttal might run
as follows:
Even if it must be conceded that legal
and ethical systems are diverse and inconsistent, this does not prove that one
legal or ethical system might not be superior to another and, therefore, better
adapted to the accomplishment of the basic
objectives of political and social organization. Natural law doctrine has never
claimed that its basic postulates are universal in the sense that they cannot be
infringed by an empirical legal order. Thus,
it is entirely possible that the legal order
of State A may be in conformity with
natural law, while that of State B may be
in violation of it. If this should be the case,
the argument would continue, there is
every reason to believe that the legal order
of State B, because it is not sufficiently
conscious of and responsive to certain ineradicable traits of human nature, will
suffer crises, breakdowns, and eventual
disintegration unless it is brought into conformity with the existential needs of human
beings.
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The legal positivist would be inclined to
meet this assertion by questioning the
availability of any scientific criterion by
which the legal order of one country could
be adjudged to be superior to that of another country. He would contend that
standards of right and wrong are conditioned and shaped by the conventions and
value patterns of a particular culture, and
that no society has the right to condemn or
criticize the ethical and legal system of
another society on the ground that its conceptions of good and bad are faulty or
inadequate. If such criticisms are voiced,
the legal positivist would argue that they
represent no more than the subjective and
irrational reactions of particular individuals
or groups and must be deemed devoid of
objective validity and rational justification.
Implicit in this rebuttal of the natural law
position is the assumption that there exist
no needs of human beings which demand
absolute recognition by all legal orders,
and that human nature is sufficiently viable
and indeterminate to lend itself to more or
less unlimited experiments of cultural conditioning and social readjustment.
Another objection is posed by the following questions. Are we in danger of
closing avenues of social improvement if
we reach firm conclusions regarding the
fixed and unchangeable traits of human
nature, and if we declare these traits to
form insuperable barriers to experimentation with the human condition by positive
law? Does the fact that up to this day we
have observed certain common ingredients
in the legal system of the world offer any
proof of the proposition that these common
norms ought to be recognized, preserved,
and perpetuated as eternal limitations on
efforts at human betterment through the
instrumentality of positive law?

The rejoinder to this objection, according to Professor Bodenheimer, must be
that none of the natural law theories that
have played a major part in the history
of jurisprudence has placed roadblocks of
this character in the path of social improvement. Although all of these theories
have recognized some intrinsic limitations
on the power of human legislators stemming from the realities of human nature,
not one of them has declared that efforts
to make men more cooperative and socialminded were contrary to the natural law
and, therefore, bound to end in failure.
On the contrary, a large majority of natural law philosophers have proceeded from
the assumption of a social instinct in man
which the institution of law is designed to
complement and reinforce. Even Thomas
Hobbes, who accentuated the selfish, uncooperative, and aggressive impulses of
men more strongly than any other natural
law philosopher, recommended a corrective
to this defective condition of human nature
through instituting strong governments capable of enforcing the observance of the
golden rule and the maintenance of mutual
respect for private rights, particularly contract and property rights. In other words,
it was the function of Hobbes' Leviathan
to educate human beings, who in the state
of nature would act like rapacious wolves
toward each other, to conduct themselves
as decent citizens and permit their fellowmen to live peaceful and undisturbed lives.
What the natural law doctrine has always asserted is that the destructive instincts of men must be kept under control,
and that curbs on violence and indiscriminate infliction of harm are necessary for
the organization and preservation of social
groups. The injunction not to injure other
members of a society has been, with cer-
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tain limitations and exceptions, one of
the chief foundations of natural law thinking. It must be conceded, however, that
this injunction has not been fully recognized with respect to relations between one
social group and those considered by it as
external or internal enemies. This does not
prove the incorrectness of the statement
that it is a fundamental aim of the law to
curb human aggression, but merely demonstrates that where human beings embark
upon a campaign of violence and extermination it is usually not the law which serves
as their guide to action.
Another criticism leveled against the
natural law philosophy gravitates around
the charge that this philosophy is apt to
produce doctrinaire intolerance, monolithic thought, autocratic government and
other barriers to human progress. Eugene
Gerhart, directing his fire chiefly against
Roman Catholic approaches to legal philosophy, has stated, "as a basis for authoritarianism . .

.

natural law provides

an ideal foundation, an excellent major
premise."
The clear reply to this, offered by Professor Bodenheimer, is that while St.
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Thomas Aquinas in his political writings
tended to give qualified support to the
political and social institutions of the
feudal society of his day, his theory of
natural law, which was a cornerstone of
his legal philosophy, was completely devoid
of any elements of intolerance or glorification of the status quo. His catalogue of
fundamental principles of natural law included the right of self-preservation, the
sex instinct, the education of one's offspring, the search for knowledge, the desire to live in society, and the avoidance
of wrongdoing to others; with respect to
the concrete implementation of these principles in different times and different societies, St. Thomas took a relativistic attitude. This broad generality of the Thomist
natural law precepts, combined with flexibility in their application, prompted
Jerome Frank, a non-Catholic thinker and
liberal-minded judge, to say that he could
not understand "how any decent man can
today refuse to adopt, as the basis of
modern civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to human
conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas."

